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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-
3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issue to be decided on Appeal is whether the court, Judge Roger S. Dutson, 
erred in denying Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Suppress. Specifically, 
Defendant/Appellant asks this court to determine that his Fomth Amendment Right to be 
protected from unreasonable search and seizure has been violated and that all evidence 
illegally obtained should be suppressed. There are two standards for review to be used in 
determining this issue: 
a. As to the facts, this court examines the trial court's findings for clear error. 
(State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) 
b. As to the law, this court examines whether the trial court made the correct 
ruling, with a certain measure of discretion allowed the trial court based on the 
facts of the case. (Id. at 1276). 
This issue was preserved for Appeal by the Defendant/Appellant's conditional 
guilty plea after denial of the Motion to Suppress. Addendum, page 10, Memorandum 
Decision, dated February 17, 1998. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,... 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant/Appellant was charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol. Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress which was heard by the 
court November 21, 1997. The trial court denied this Motion on February 17, 
1998. The Defendant/Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea and was 
sentenced on or about April 22, 1998. The trial court also issued a Certificate of 
Probable Cause that day and a Notice of Appeal was also filed April 22, 1998. 
The facts of the case relevant to the issue presented for review are 
as follows: 
1. On September 24, 1997 at approximately 2:20 a.m., Defendant was 
driving his vehicle west on 26th Street, in approximately the 800 block, 
in Ogden City. 
2. Officer Lane Olson, Ogden City Police, was on-duty at that time in the 
1000 block of 26th Street and observed Defendant's vehicle. 
3. Defendant's vehicle was traveling at a slow rate of speed, no more 
than 15 mph, and had its hazard lights activated. 
4. Defendant's vehicle was traveling in the middle of the outside lane. 
5. The officer stated he pulled up to within 50 feet behind Defendant's 
vehicle. 
6. Defendant testified the officer pulled up so closely that his lights were 
directly reflecting from Defendant's rear view mirror so that 
Defendant thought the bright lights were on from the officer's vehicle. 
7. The Defendant pulled over to the side of the road and stopped. 
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8. The officer pulled in behind Defendant's vehicle. 
9. The officer called in the stop as a 'motorist assist". 
10. The officer approached Defendant as Defendant sat in his vehicle. 
11. The officer confronted Defendant and motioned for Defendant to roll 
down his window. 
12. Defendant rolled down his window and the officer asked if Defendant 
was having vehicle problems, to which Defendant said, "ye s" 
13. The officer asked if Defendant needed help and Defendant said, ' W . 
14. The officer asked if he could contact someone for Defendant, and he 
replied, "no". 
15. The officer indicated that he smelled alcohol when Defendant spoke, 
but did not smell alcohol prior to Defendant talking. 
16. The officer then asked for ED, and Defendant gave the officer his Utah 
State Identification card. 
17. The officer then asked for Defendant's Driver's License. Defendant 
asked, "Why, you asked for ID?" The officer said, "Yes, but I want 
your Driver's License." 
18. The officer indicated that Defendant was detained when he asked for 
ED, but that he suspected Defendant has been drinking before he asked 
for Defendant's ID. 
19. Defendant felt he could not leave when the officer faced the vehicle 
and motioned for Defendant to roll down the window. 
20. No improper or suspicious driving pattern was observed by the officer. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The officer seized the Defendant/Appellant by approaching from the rear with his 
bright lights on which caused Defendant/Appellant to pull over to the side of the road. 
The officer then motioned Defendant/Appellant to roll down his window which he did. 
The officer had no reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant/Appellant. The officer's 
actions violated the Defendant/Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights and all evidence 
should be suppressed. 
The officer was told by Defendant/Appellant that he did not need assistance. The 
officer continued to question the Defendant/Appellant which led to continued detainment. 
The officer's continued detainment exceeded the scope of the stop. Thus, all evidence 
should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STANDARD FOR REVIEW FOR THIS CASE WAS SET BY THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT IN TERRY V. OHIO. 
The standards to evaluate whether Defendant/Appellant's Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure has been violated, have been set by 
the United States Supreme Court. In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), 
the Supreme Court set forth a two prong test the government must meet to overcome the 
Fourth Amendment protection. First, the officer's initial stop must be justified and 
second, his subsequent actions must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying 
the stop. The court further held that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even if the purpose 
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of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 
59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979), as quoted in State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 
1994). 
In the Prouse case, and officer stopped a vehicle to check the driver's license and 
registration information even though he had observed no violations, nor any suspicious 
activity. As the officer walked towards the vehicle, he smelled marijuana smoke and 
seized marijuana in plain view on the car floor. The court held that the trial court 
properly suppressed the evidence because the officer had no reasonable suspicion to 
justify the stop and thus had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The result in the instant case should be the same. The officer in this case had no 
reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant/Appellant's car. There was no suspicious driving 
pattern, no violations of any traffic or other laws and no other suspicious activity. Even 
after Defendant/Appellant pulled over, once the officer determined that Defendant did not 
want help he should have left the scene. See State v. Tetmeyer. 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah 
App. 1997) for general discussion of reasonable suspicion. The smell of alcohol did not 
cure the officer's violation of Defendant/Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
The result should be the same even though the officer said he smelled alcohol. In 
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994), the court held that the evidence should 
have been suppressed by the trial court, based on the Terry and Prouse decisions. In that 
case an officer received a report of a possible car prowl/car burglary at an apartment 
complex. The dispatcher said the suspect was a chunky male, possibly Hispanic, with a 
white tee-shirt. When the officer responded he noticed a vehicle with two occupants 
leaving the area. The officer felt the passenger fit the description given by the dispatcher. 
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He stopped the vehicle but determined that they were there for the purpose of dropping 
off a friend who lived at the complex. During the course of the conversation the oflBcer 
detected an odor of alcohol and arrested the driver for DUI. The Utah Appellate Court 
held that there were no facts to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
justify the stop. Further, the stop was unlawful because the oflBcer was not able to 
corroborate any information given him by the dispatcher. The court then directed the 
trial court to suppress ".. .all evidence flowing from the seizure...," Case, at 1280, even 
though the oflBcer smelled alcohol while conversing with the Defendant. 
In the instant case, the oflBcer had no facts whatsoever to support a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity of this Defendant, to justify stopping him. Therefore, here, 
as in Case the stop was unlawful. Thus, this court should suppress all evidence flowing 
from the seizure. 
EVEN IF THE OFFICER'S DETENTION OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS 
LAWFUL HE EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE DETENTION 
Even if this court holds that the stop was lawful, the court should find that the 
oflBcer exceeded the scope of the stop and thus violated the second prong of Terry. In 
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992), the court so held. There, an 
officer stopped a vehicle from out-of-state and having determined there was no illegal 
activity, continued to question the driver. The oflBcer stated the Defendant/driver 
appeared nervous and thus the oflBcer asked Defendant if he could search the car, 
Dciendant agreed, and the oflBcer found four kilograms of cocaine in the trunk. The 
court held that the officer's continued questioning of the Defendant exceeded the scope 
of the stop and so suppressed the evidence of the cocaine. 
7 
In the instant case, once the officer determined Defendant/Appellant did not want 
assistance he should have walked away. The officer only smelled alcohol when 
Defendant/Appellant talked. He did not smell alcohol when Defendant/Appellant rolled 
down the window, prior to answering the officer's questions. There was no other 
evidence of illegal driving, and it is not a violation of law for a person to drive a vehicle 
while his or her breath smells like alcohol. The officer's subsequent actions, after 
determining Defendant/Appellant did not want assistance, exceeded the scope of the stop 
and thus the court should suppress all evidence obtained by the officer. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, because the officer did not legally stop Defendant/Appellant the 
court should suppress all evidence flowing therefrom, including field sobriety tests, 
intoxilyzer test results, statements made by Defendant/Appellant and all other evidence. 
Assuming, arguendo, the stop was legal, the court should still suppress all evidence 
flowing therefrom, because the officer exceeded the scope of the stop. 
Respectfully submitted thispc Ojn day of June, 1998. 
Tfed K. Godfrey 
Attorney for Defenda 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 




NEAL C. KROGH, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 975006623 TC 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
The court finds the initial stop of defendant by the officer was proper under permitted 
community caretaking functions. The court finds that during the initial conversation the officer 
observed the odor of alcohol coming from the driver of this vehicle which had been driving very 
slowly down the road at about 2:00 a.m. with his emergency lights blinking. The driver told the 
officer he was having vehicle problems but that he did not want any assistance. 
The court finds from the foregoing facts there were enough unusual circumstances to justify 
an articulable suspicion to proceed with further investigation of a suspected DUI. Therefore, 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this P t h day of February. 1 9 9 8 ^ " C* ' A ) X 
ROGER S. DUTSON bty T^ UML Wood 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ^i** cuJddnau^CUJJ&n. 
City vs. Krogh 
975006623 TC 
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